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CRUIKSHANK, AND THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Robert C Palmer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Substantive due process is the legacy of allegiance to precedents 
misunderstood and inadequately analyzed. The 1873 decision in the 
Slaughter-House Cases1 has always appeared to nullify judicially the 
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment of the 
United States Constitution.2 The Court's reasoning in Slaughter-
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University of Iowa. I am particularly indebted to Professors Frederick Schauer of the University of 
Michigan, John B. Corr of Marshall- Wythe, and William Nelson of New York University Law 
School for their critical comments and encouragement, and to my research assistant, Michael 
Sterling. 
I. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). This article's analysis of Slaughter-House proceeds on the 
assumption that each opinion is logically consistent within itself until demonstrated otherwise. A 
traditional or seemingly natural deduction from an isolated passage cannot be probative if it runs 
contrary to the argument as a whole and if commentators can alternatively interpret the passage as 
consistent with that argument. Traditional analyses of Slaughter-House tend to focus on isolated 
statements without reference to the whole argument. The danger there is obvious. The danger 
here is attributing too much rationality and intellectual rigor to a particular Justice. For our legal 
system, however, the argument is more important than judicial reputation. That latter danger is 
thus the one that we should accept as a by-product of a legal system that demands reasoned 
explanations of judgments. 
2. See J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 107 (1983); R. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 10 (1981); C. 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1875, at 184-85 (1939); H. HY-
MAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, 
at 477-78 (1982); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432-33 (5th 
ed. 1980); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGH11 A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO 
REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 193 (1975); R. MYKKELTVEDT, THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 15 (1983); 2 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 763 (1968); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 7-4, at 423 (1978); Beth, The 
Slaughter-House Case9-Revisited, 23 LA. L. REv. 487, 493, 497 (1963); Conant, Antimonopoly 
Tradition under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-examined, 31 
EMORY L.J. 785, 789 (1982); McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause-Fourteenth Amendment, 
4 IOWA L. BuLL. 219, 230 (1918); Morris, What are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the 
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House, however, demands a substantial role for that clause in adjudi-
cating constitutional rights. In Slaughter-House the Supreme Court 
made its first and broadest consideration of a major new approach to 
analyzing the relationship between the states and the federal govern-
ment. The Court also decided on a mode of constitutional interpreta-
tion that provided adherence to constitutional original intent even 
when socially there was no single, definable, original intent. In United 
States v. Cruikshank,3 only three years later, a somewhat differently 
constituted Supreme Court ignored the problem of original intent and 
misconstrued Slaughter-House. The inferior reasoning in Cruikshank 
thereafter prevented accurate intetpretation and acceptance of the care-
ful reasoning of Slaughter-House. 
This article analyzes both Slaughter-House and Cruikshank by fo-
cusing first on the reasoned construction of the fourteenth amendment 
suggested in Slaughter-House. Under the Slaughter-House reasoning, 
the fourteenth amendment incorporates enumerated liberties as privi-
leges or immunities of United States citizenship which courts may en-
force against the states. While adopting a moderate interpretation of 
the fourteenth amendment privileges or immunities clause, the Slaugh-
ter-House Court concomitantly adopted a restrictive construction of the 
due process clause. Cruikshank's rejection of the Slaughter-House ap-
proach led later Courts to construe expansively the due process clause. 
That process resulted in modem exaggerated constructions of the four-
teenth amendment in decisions like Roe v. Wade. 5 
This article examines the development of constitutional doctrine 
from Slaughter-House to Cruikshank in three sections. The first section 
is a detailed analysis of Justice Miller's majority opinion in Slaughter-
House, examining his reasoning and the derivation of his constitutional 
test. The second section analyzes the dissenting opinions in Slaughter-
House, showing the radical and unacceptable nature of their argu-
ments. The third section discusses how in Cruikshank Chief Justice 
Waite nullified the privileges or immunities clause without confronting 
the language or the intent of the fourteenth amendment. 6 This article 
United Stales?, 28 W.VA. L.Q. 38, 52 (1921); Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-
House Cases, 4 S.L. REv. (n.s.) 558, 576 (1878); Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RuTGERS L. 
REv. 552, 555 (1971). Two minor exceptions to the traditional interpretation are 2 W.W. CRoss-
KEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1128-30 (1953) and J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
196-97 (1980). See infra note 40. None of the commentators analyze the case as a coherent argu-
ment. The approaches run from selective quotation to the formulation of a series of propositions. 
None go through the entire opinion to ascertain what role each part of the opinion plays in the 
argument. The willingness to be content with superficial impressions is surprising. 
3. 92 u.s. 542 (1876). 
4. Tribe was so taken by Justice Waite's analysis that he used Cruikshank to explain 
Slaughter-House. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 420. 
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
6. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 2, at 433. Only for a brief period 
of time did the Court ever find that state legislation violated the privileges or immunities clause. 
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concludes that Slaughter-House embodies the Court's most rational 
handling of the fourteenth amendment. The Slaughter-House rationale 
required that the first eight amendments and much of article I section 9 
of the Constitution apply as restrictions on state action through the 
privileges or immunities clause rather than through the due process 
clause. If the Supreme Court returned to Slaughter-House and re-
stricted state action by using the privileges or immunities clause, the 
Court would avoid the problems of expansive construction of due pro-
cess. The Court would once more be applying constitutional provisions 
of reasonably definite parameters. 
II. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE: THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller constructed a carefully circum-
scribed argument that coordinated the fourteenth amendment with the 
rest of the Constitution while according a proper and substantial mean-
ing to the privileges or immunities clause. Justice Miller's was a middle 
course, defined and revised in response to vigorous criticism from the 
dissenting Justices.7 Miller intended the privileges or immunities 
clause to apply the first eight amendments and certain clauses of article 
I section 9 of the United States Constitution as restrictions on state ac-
tion. The major problems in understanding the opinion, however, per-
tain to the derivation of the "existence and protection" test for 
fourteenth amendment protection and the influence of the comity 
clause.8 
A. Determination of Constitutional Purpose 
In Slaughter-House various Louisiana butchers argued that a Lou-
isiana state-granted monopoly violated their thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The monop-
oly granted one corporation the exclusive right to disembark cattle and 
to provide facilities for cattle slaughter in and around New Orleans. 
The butchers' thirteenth amendment claim was that the monopoly es-
tablished an involuntary servitude by restricting the butchers' ability to 
work.9 Their fourteenth amendment claims focused on the infringe-
ment of their right to work by. the grant of an unreasonably large mo-
nopoly. The butchers argued that the state-created monopoly violated 
7. For dissenting arguments concerning the status of inhabitants of territories, frustration of 
tbe whole amendment, and an African-only approach, see 83 U.S. at 90, 96, 119. The arguments 
are answered at id at 72, 79, 72 respectively. Furthermore, Field's criticism of Miller's use of Paul 
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), is not really pertinent to Miller's actual statements. See 
83 U.S. at 76-77. The internal debate, of course, might have allowed Miller to anticipate tbe 
arguments in the dissents. 
8. ''The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens 
in the several States." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. 
9. 83 U.S. at 49-51. 
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their privileges or immunities as United States citizens. 10 
None of the Justices doubted the state's right to exercise reason-
ably its police powers in such matters. 11 The majority, however, af-
firmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana and ruled that 
federal courts had no jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the 
state action. Therefore the opinion insulated states from federal re-
view, at least regarding grants of monopolies. 12 The subject matter of 
this case-an economic and unenumerated liberty instead of an enu-
merated liberty-was a major factor in the later distortion of Justice 
Miller's careful construction of the fourteenth amendment. 
Although Miller determined the original intent of the Reconstruc-
tion amendments by a quasi-historical method, he modified this ap-
proach in two ways. To Miller, the wording and grammar of the actual 
amendments were always the best indicators of the amendments' pur-
pose. 13 He thus believed that interpretational problems presented by 
ambiguous or conflicting language were important even if the questions 
thus raised had not been foreseen in the course of adopting the amend-
ment. 14 Moreover, Miller believed that the historical setting derived 
from the Justices' personal knowledge should be applied only in choos-
ing between two possible interpretations of the wording. 15 
Using this analytic approach, Miller dismissed the thirteenth 
amendment argument. That amendment prohibited slavery and other 
involuntary personal servitudes. The butchers' argument, based on in-
convenience, payments to the monopoly slaughterhouse, and depriva-
tion of their own slaughtering facilities, was classified not as a personal 
servitude, but as a property servitude. 16 Even dissenting Justice Field, 
although sympathetic, was unable to support the thirteenth amendment 
claim. 17 
In contrast to the thirteenth amendment claim, the Justices were 
10. /d at 51-54. 
II. /d at 62-66, 87-88, 113-14. W. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 
1830-1900, at 152 (1982) seems to say that the major dispute between Miller and Field was inter-
preting the facts. On the contrary, the major issue was the status of state governments. 
12. 83 U.S. at 82-83. 
13. Miller's careful analysis of the characteristics of citizenship and the consequent need to 
distinguish between state and federal privileges or immunities prove the priority of the language 
and grammar in his analysis. This priority is appropriate because the Supreme Court should not 
interpret the Constitution as emanating from the framers, the Congress, or the majority in the 
ratifying bodies, but rather from the people as a whole. If one accepts this view, analysis of the 
language is the only way to ascertain what the people wanted, because of the multitude of ambigu-
ities and compromises embedded in adopting any constitutional provision. 
14. Incorporation of the first eight amendments and article I, § 9 was not the social under-
standing of the effect of the privileges or immunities clause, even though some still argue that 
position. SeeR. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 2, at 7-ll. Such incorporation, however, is the only 
approach that reconciles the varied motivations behind the fourteenth amendment with the am-
biguous language of the amendment, in that it places substantial new restrictions on states while 
retaining them as independent centers of social policy. 
15. 83 U.S. at 68. 
16. ld at 69. 
17. ld at 89-90. 
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unable to agree on the historical purpose of the fourteenth amendment. 
The butchers' best argument rested on the privileges or immunities 
clause. However, this argument conflicted with the majority's historical 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. The majority reasoned 
that Congress passed the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to inval-
idate Southern laws permitting the continued subjection of former 
slaves. The majority concluded that the purpose of all three amend-
ments was thus the same: to assure the "freedom of the slave race." 
Miller argued that the amendments would not have been suggested had 
it not been for the race problem. Freedom of blacks was thus both the 
cause and the purpose of the Reconstruction amendments. 18 
The majority's determination of the purpose of the amendments 
was crucial to the Slaughter-House holding. At the close of his opin-
ion, 19 Miller considered and rejected an alternative interpretation of 
the purpose of the amendment: to change the entire relationship be-
tween federal and state governments. This was the purpose that Jus-
tices Field, Bradley, and Swayne perceived.20 Enunciating the purpose 
as "freedom of the slave race" as opposed to "complete change of the 
federal system" provided substantial meaning for the amendment but 
dictated a restrictive reading. The racial freedom purpose, although 
not pertaining to blacks only,21 yielded a high threshold test: the four-
. teenth amendment would protect only those privileges or immunities 
that fell "necessarily" and "properly" within the provision's lan-
guage.22 The protection had to accord with the judicially perceived 
purpose. Within that context, Miller began his clause-by-clause analy-
sis of the fourteenth amendment. 
18. As Miller wrote: 
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at 
the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we 
mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and 
the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had 
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. 
Id at 71. 
19. ld at 82. 
20. ld at 95, 123, 129; see infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 22, 46-48, 57-58 and accompanying text. 
22. The opinion states: 
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the language 
and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of construc-
tion. Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which pro-
posed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter .... [He 
includes explicitly Mexican peonage and Chinese coolie labor systems.] And so if other rights 
are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these 
articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of African de-
scent. . . . [I]t is necessary to look to the purpose. . . . 
83 U.S. at 72. It is the thirteenth amendment context that gives this passage a racial-only tone, but 
even so the passage is a clear refutation of the "black-only" allegation levelled at Miller. See, e.g., 
J. BAER, supra note 2, at 107. 
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B. The Privileges or Immunities Clause 
Miller and the dissenting Justices agreed that the fourteenth 
amendment citizenship clause determined how they would interpret the 
privileges or immunities clause. The historical context of the citizen-
ship clause was that Congress added it to overrule the Dred Scott deci-
sion,23 which held that a black man could not be a citizen of a state 
such that he could also be a citizen of the United States or receive the 
protections mandated by the Constitution.24 The citizenship clause as-
serted two types of citizenship based on different characteristics. 
United States citizenship depended on birth or naturalization; state citi-
zenship, on residency.25 To Miller, the duality of citizenship in the first 
clause meant that the immediately succeeding privileges or immunities 
clause secured against state action only the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States. There thus remained another category-
privileges or immunities of citizens of a state-that received no addi-
tional protection from this part of the fourteenth amendment. Because 
Miller reasoned that the language and grammar of the amendment 
were controlling, he found this conclusion irresistible. 26 
Miller first determined that the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States did not automatically include every fundamental 
civil liberty.27 He deduced from the duality of citizenship that each 
citizenship carried with it a different set of privileges or immunities. 
However, he did not take the further step and assert that the sets were 
discrete.28 Miller used the immunities from ex post facto laws and bills 
23. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
24. 83 U.S. at 73. I use only Miller's and Field's readings of Dred Sco/1. For a modem 
analysis, see D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTT CASE (1978). 
25. 83 U.S. at 73 (quoting the Constitution: "All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
26. Justice Field, for instance, agreed on the grammar but argued that the class of rights left 
to the states alone included only those rights that were incidental and non-fundamental in nature. 
83 U.S. at 95, 98; see infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
27. In discussing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), in the 
Slaughter-House opinion, Miller was not trying to define which rights remained to the states. 
Miller did not state his objective, but one may derive its limited nature from the sequence of the 
opinion-he did not reach his conclusion immediately after treating Corfteld. His treatment of 
Corfteldis thus very important, but not as crucial as most commentators believe. If there is logical 
coherence to his case-a necessary presumption-his objective was only to reject the funda-
mentality test. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
28. Miller made several assertions that have led people to conclude that he thought the sets 
were discrete. He stated that the citizenships are distinct. He characterized the plaintiffs' argument 
as resting on the assumption that the citizenship and resultant privileges and immunities were the 
same. He stated that, "If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immunities belong-
ing to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizen of the state as such, 
the latter must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested . . . . " 83 
U.S. at 74-75. Lusky asserts, without documentation, that Miller took a further step. "Each type 
of citizenship, Federal and state, carries with it a distinct set of privileges and immunities and the 
two sets do not overlap; thus whatever is a privilege or immunity of state citizenship cannot be a 
privilege or immunity of federal citizenship." See L. LusKY, supra note 2, at 191. This is a com-
pletely traditional product of a '::ruikshank reading of Slaughter-House. 
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of attainder as prominent examples of immunities against governmen-
tal action that persons enjoy in the same relationship and character 
both as state citizens and as United States citizens.29 There was thus 
necessarily a certain area where state immunities overlapped with fed-
eral immunities. His objective at this point, however, was merely to 
show that some fundamental rights remained solely within the sphere 
of the states. For Miller, this conclusion elucidated the general charac-
ter of the nature of federal government. Miller simply argued that the 
privileges or immunities of state and United States citizenship are not 
identical. 
Miller relied on the comity clause, as interpreted in Corjield v. 
Coryelf3° and affirmed in Ward v. Maryland, 31 to establish the impor-
tance of rights left to the states. Miller easily turned to Corjield, be-
cause in both Corjield and Slaughter-House the right allegedly 
infringed was an economic right endangered by a state-granted monop-
oly. In Corjield, Judge Washington provided three criteria to identify 
those privileges and immunities of state citizenship that states had to 
grant to citizens of another state. The privileges and immunities must 
be "fundamental," possessed by citizens of all free governments as of 
right, and possessed continuously by state citizens since the United 
States's independence from Britain.32 Miller concluded that the privi-
leges and immunities of a state citizen embraced "nearly every civil 
right for the establishment and protection of which organized govern-
ment is instituted.'m Since duality of citizenship dictated that the two 
sets of privileges or immunities were different, the fourteenth amend-
ment did not automatically protect every civil right merely because it 
was fundamental. 
Having dismissed a test based on the importance of the right con-
cerned, Miller then defined how any privileges or immunities clause 
would operate. All the Justices felt that the privileges or immunities 
language of the fourteenth amendment and of the comity clause carried 
a similar meaning. Likewise, all the Justices agreed that a similar 
meaning dictated identical operation.34 That identical operation 
presented Miller with the danger-and the dissenting Justices with the 
prospect--of an interpretation of the fourteenth amendment that would 
29. 83 U.S. at 77. 
30. 6 F. Cas. 546. 
31. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871). 
32. Judge Washington stated: 
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which 
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free govern-
ments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which 
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. 
6 F. Cas. at 551. For the accuracy of Miller's treatment of Coljield, see infra notes 69-77 and 
accompanying text. 
33. 83 U.S. at 76. For Miller's misquotation of the comity clause, see infra notes 54-56 and 
accompanying text. 
34. For Field's agreement, see infra notes 84-87. 
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transmute all fundamental privileges and immunities of a state citizen 
into privileges or immunities of United States citizens. Under such an 
interpretation, the fourteenth amendment alone, by construction and 
without unambiguous mandate, would then have completely over-
turned the federal structure established by the rest of the Constitution. 
Miller obviated that danger by his construction of the 1869 deci-
sion in Paul v. Virginia,35 which held that one state need not recognize 
special privileges conferred by another state. Thus, under the comity 
clause, while in state B a citizen of state A in addition to the Corjield 
tripartite test, was entitled only to those privileges and immunities com-
mon to citizens of state B. State B did not need to recognize special 
privileges granted in state A, such as corporate status and the associated 
rights. By Miller's construction of Paul v. Virginia, the comity clause 
did not create new rights in state B; it did not force any state to recog-
nize rights granted by other states. Moreover, the comity clause did not 
prevent a state from restricting its citizens' rights as long as the state did 
not treat citizens of other states worse than its own citizens. 36 Miller 
used Paul v. Virginia to establish the manner in which the privileges or 
immunities clause would work: the fourteenth amendment clause 
would not automatically transmute into federal ri~hts all important 
rights enjoyed by the citizens of the various states.3 
Miller derived from Paul v. Virginia an "existence and protection" 
test for determining the necessary and proper fourteenth amendment 
privileges or immunities.38 Under this test, any right that owed its 
existence and protection to the federal government fell within the privi-
leges or immunities clause; otherwise the right remained solely a privi-
lege or immunity of a state citizen.39 Later in the opinion, Miller 
concentrated solely on "existence" but did not alter the affect of the 
test.40 
35. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). 
36. 83 U.S. at 77. Field's lengthy refutation emphasizes the importance of this part of the 
argument. See id. at 99-101. 
37. Field would argue his way to the contrary conclusion. See infra note 87 and accompany-
ing text. 
38. 83 U.S. at 77. Here Miller is very careful not to exclude incorporation. He talks about 
the improbability of transferring the protection of "all the civil rights" and "the entire domain of 
civil rights" (emphasis added). Neither of those formulations would exclude partial transfer. 
Moreover, he was concerned only about those civil rights that had belonged "exclusively to the 
states." That would not include liberties expressed in the Constitution, even if there they were 
only partially protected. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
39. 83 U.S. at 77 (whether the rights of state citizenship "depended on the Federal govern-
ment for their existence and protection. . . . "). 
40. "But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those 
we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their existence to 
the Federal government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws." /d. at 79. This was 
mere shorthand; I cannot perceive anythirtg that would have changed had he also stipulated "pro-
tection" here. Crosskey maintains that assembly, petition, and habeas corpus rights were buried 
in the listing so that no one would notice them; the Court could thus ignore the matter at will. See 
2 W.W. CROSSKEY, supra note~. at 1128-30. Ely maintains that it is possible to read Slaughter-
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Miller's "existence and protection" test may have been inappropri-
ate to the factual circumstances of Slaughter-House. Rather, the test 
makes the most sense in the context of Paul v. Virginia, which focused 
on the creation of rights.41 The existence and protection language was 
perfectly appropriate for discussing corporate rights. Only state action 
brings a corporation into existence; a corporation cannot have preexist-
ing or inherent rights. Corporate rights thus derive from governmental 
action. Both Paul v. Virginia and Slaughter-House involved a grant; to 
Miller, that similarity justified using the test. In Paul v. Virginia, how-
ever, the grant created the right claimed. In Slaughter-House the grant 
was made in violation of the right claimed. The rights claimed in 
Slaughter-House, moreover, were quite different from those in Paul v. 
Virginia. The Slaughter-House rights were deemed to be preexisting, 
either by natural law or by ancient common law. Miller, however, did 
not elucidate the provenance of his test; the propriety of the analogy 
never came into question. The "existence and protection" test, whether 
or not appropriate, determined the scope of the fourteenth amendment. 
By applying that test, the Court excluded the rights claimed in 
Slaughter-House from fourteenth amendment protection. Some rights 
clearly depended on the federal government for their existence and 
protection. Miller identified several article I, section 10 provisions as 
privileges or immunities that the federal government assured against 
state action: security against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and 
laws impairing the obligations of contracts. The Constitution, how-
ever, provided no protection against states that unreasonably granted 
monopolies or hindered the pursuit of a common occupation. Such 
privileges or immunities, regardless of their fundamental nature, did 
not owe their existence or protection to the federal government. They 
fell within the exclusive cognizance of the states as a privilege or immu-
nity of a citizen of that state.42 Fortuitously, that result coincided with 
Miller's perceived purpose of the fourteenth amendment: the butchers' 
claim had no relation to the purpose of "freedom of the slave race."43 
Miller thus derived a test based on case law that yielded an answer 
within his parameters. The right to pursue a common occupation free 
from unreasonable state-granted monopolies did not fall properly 
within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. 
Miller reached his conclusion only rhetorically, but his point was 
well-made. At most, Slaughter-House concerned gross corruption exer-
cised under the guise of the state's inherent authority to license matters 
of health and safety. On the face of the claim, there was no racial dis-
crimination. The state courts and the ballot box may have been the 
House in a way that would have the whole Court agreed on incorporation of the first eight amend-
. ments, but his comment seems based only on the listing. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 196-97. 
41. 75 U.S. at 178-81. 
42. 83 U.S. at 77-78. 
43. ld at 78. 
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appropriate forum for redress. A holding for the plaintiffs would have 
subjected the whole range of state legislative activity to federal reason-
ableness review.44 That result would not have merely reshuffled pow-
ers, but would have completely restructured the relationship between 
state and federal governments. State governments would have become 
incidental. Miller properly asked whether the fourteenth amendment 
could have been intended to transfer such massive authority to the fed-
eral government. 
Miller then answered the dissenting Justices' allegation that his 
test nullified the privileges or immunities clause. He was convinced 
that the test would be improper if the clause played no role in constitu-
tional adjudication. For Miller, constitutional provisions had to have 
substantial meaning. He listed three sources from which one might de-
rive the privileges or immunities of United States citizens: the require-
ments of the national character of the federal government, the 
Constitution, and federal law. He then set down a list-intentionally 
incomplete45-of the privileges or immunities that would fall within 
the fourteenth amendment under his test. Significantly, most of the 
privileges or immunities listed did not relate directly to the purpose of 
"freedom of the slave race"; the test, not the individuals or the right 
concerned, was primary. 
In 1868, Crandall v. Nevada 46 listed the privileges or immunities 
that could be derived from the necessities of a national government. In 
Crandall the Court had not been concerned with any particular consti-
tutional provision, but rather with the derivation of privileges or immu-
nities from the general nature of the federal government. In other 
words, certain state practices would negate a national government. 
Under Crandall, these "national" privileges included the right of access 
to the federal government and sea ports, the right of a citizen of the 
United States to protection when abroad, the right to use navigable 
waters, and the right to enjoy rights secured by American treaties with 
foreign countries. 
Miller did not limit fourteenth amendment privileges and immuni-
ties to the context of racial discrimination. Access to the federal gov-
ernment would have been relevant for accomplishing the "freedom of 
the slave race," but the other rights were fairly irrelevant to that pur-
pose. Nevertheless, Miller felt that other rights fell necessarily and 
properly within the scope of the privileges or immunities clause.47 But 
these rights were already protected by the Court after Crandall without 
44. A review of the reasonableness of state actions would not have retained the state charac-
ter that the Court felt necessary. In some substantive areas, the states had to retain their position 
as independent centers of social policy formulation. Reasonableness review was the core of the 
Radical Republican position. 
45. See supra note 40. 
46. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (majority opinion by Miller, J.). 
47. See supra note 22. 
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reference to the fourteenth amendment. Had these rights been the sole 
content of Miller's version of the privileges or immunities clause, that 
portion of the fourteenth amendment would have been merely declara-
tory, a reaffirmation of the supremacy clause.48 Miller's listing of na-
tional rights shows, at the very least, that Miller would not use the 
purpose of "freedom of the slave race" to tailor the scope of the amend-
ment only to blacks. The general language of the amendment required 
that other matters would necessarily and properly fall into the scope of 
fourteenth amendment protection. 
The major new restrictions on state action came from the privi-
leges or immunities Miller derived from the Constitution. He clearly 
asserted that "the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress 
of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of 
the citizen guarantied [sic] by the Federal Constitution."49 These are 
clearly not Crandall rights, not rights necessitated by the national char-
acter of the federal government. In his analysis, Miller listed the Cran-
dall rights first in his three sources for determining privileges or 
immunities. He then considered the privileges or immunities derived 
from the Constitution, such as access to the federal government. More-
over, he specified that assembly, petition, and habeas corpus rights are 
drawn from the Constitution: thus, from the first amendment and arti-
cle I, section 9. Prior to the fourteenth amendment, all three of these 
rights restricted only the actions of the federal government. 50 Miller 
could have listed other privileges or immunities more cautiously, but 
he did not even bother to repeat those privileges or immunities that 
prior to the fourteenth amendment the Constitution already assured 
against state governments: security against ex post facto laws, bills of 
attainder, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts.51 This list-
ing, then, constitutes the best evidence of how Miller thought judges 
should apply his test and of the necessary effect of the fourteenth 
amendment privileges or immunities clause. 
The listing of habeas corpus rights in particular renders untenable 
the traditional view that Miller construed the privileges or immunities 
clause as merely declaratory.52 That interpretation would have Miller 
positing some state interference with the federal right that the four-
teenth amendment then forbade. The kind of interference normally 
assumed was state interference with access to courts to obtain the writs, 
but that would have been a Crandall right of access to federal govern-
ment officials, not an article I, section 9 right.53 The only way a state 
48. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2. 
49. 83 U.S. at 79. 
50. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248-49 (1833). 
51. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. I; 83 U.S. at 77. 
52. See, e.g., L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 191-93. 
53. Crandall rights are rights that citizens have merely as a correlate to the necessary powers 
of the federal government. Such rights were already protected against state interference. State 
obstruction of individuals attempting to obtain habeas corpus was handled not by article I, § 9, 
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could abridge the article I, section 9 habeas corpus right was to grant 
the federal government the power to suspend the issuance of habeas 
corpus writs beyond the named emergencies. Not only had that never 
been attempted, the suggestion is ludicrous on its face. Therefore, 
Miller could not have meant that the only effect of the privileges or 
immunities clause was to forbid states from interfering with already 
established federal privileges and immunities. 
Miller's listing demonstrates that those privileges or immunities 
that prior to 1868 only restricted the federal government would now 
also restrict state governments. Therefore, in regard to habeas corpus, 
the fourteenth amendment forbids both federal and state governments 
from denying issuance of the writs except in the named situations. The 
rights to assemble peaceably and petition the government undergo the 
same transformation. Miller's listing of the rights comes clearly from 
the first amendment, since he says the rights are derived from the Con-
stitution. He would have been quite clear had he been talking of peti-
tion and assembly in a Crandall v. Nevada fashion, as petitioning or 
assembling for a national purpose. The proper conclusion is that that 
kind of privilege or immunity that individuals had had against federal 
government action they now had against state government action. 
These privileges or immunities are directly related to the purpose of the 
fourteenth amendment. As with Crandall rights, however, once Miller 
formulated the test, he did not use the suggested purpose of the four-
teenth amendment to select rights within the protected categories. The 
privileges or immunities enumerated in the Constitution would be in-
corporated via the privileges or immunities clause. 
Miller thought the fourteenth amendment accomplished its pur-
pose by a change in jurisdiction without creating any new rights.54 
Prior to the fourteenth amendment, individuals had a right to assem-
ble. That right was protected in part by the federal government 
(against federal action and against all and sundry when the assembly 
was for a national purpose)55 and in part by state governments (in all 
other cases of infringement). The right to assemble peaceably, by 
but by the Crandall right of access to federal institutions. Article I, § 9 merely forbade the federal 
government's denial of habeas corpus; it did not vest in the individual a right against state ob-
struction, nor did it mandate that the number of federal courts be sufficiently large that citizens 
would have easy access to federal habeas corpus. 
54. In his article, Morris tries to refute precisely this kind of perception. "Apparently the 
idea is that there is some sort of trans-substantiation of the 'right' into the personality of the 
beneficiary of it and it thereafter is his and ought to be exercisable in any aspect of his life." See 
Morris, supra note 2, at 46 n.40. 
55. Regarding the right to assemble, the Court stated: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a 
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the 
national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection 
of, and guarantied (sic] by, the United States .... If it had been alleged in these counts that 
the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have 
been within the statute, and within the sovereignty of the United States. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53 (note that the defendants in Cruikshank were private individuals). 
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virtue of the first amendment, owed its existence and protection in part 
to the federal government and was thus one of the privileges or immu-
nities of United States citizens. The fourteenth amendment now for-
bade the states from infringing on those specified rights. The 
amendment completed federal jurisdiction in those matters but created 
no new rights as such. The difference between these matters and free-
dom from unreasonable monopolies was that the former were identifi-
able privileges or immunities of United States citizens. 56 
The language of the amendment requires this conclusion, but so 
also does Miller's interpretation of the purpose of the fourteenth 
amendment. He previously had expressed his perception of the racial 
problem and the problem of post-thirteenth amendment southern legis-
lation. 57 Part of that problem was that southern legislation also sup-
pressed whites by denying them the ability to assemble, petition, speak, 
and exercise generally their civil liberties in favor of black freedom. 
"Freedom of the slave race" for Miller was necessarily not a "negro-
only" formulation. And so he later affirmed. 58 
In the headnotes to Slaughter-House, which he authored,59 and in 
the next case decided by the Supreme Court, Bradwell v. State,60 Miller 
confirmed that he approved of the completion of federal jurisdiction 
even though he disallowed the creation of new rights. The headnotes, 
for example, indicate the privileges or immunities clause granted new 
powers to the federal government. 
The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are 
those which arise out of the nature and essential character of the 
56. For a treatment of the ninth amendment problem involved in distinguishing between 
enumerated and unenumerated rights, see infra note 74. 
57. Miller previously had stated: 
Show me a single white man that has been punished in a State court for murdering a negro or 
a Union man. Show me that. any public meeting has been had to express indignation at such 
conduct. Show me that you or any of the best men of the South have gone ten steps out of 
their way to bring such men to punishment or to take any steps to prevent a recurrence of 
such things. Show me the first public address or meeting of Southern men in which the 
massacres of New Orleans or Memphis have been condemned or any general dissent shown 
at home at such conduct. You may say that there are two sides to those stories of Memphis 
and New Orleans. There may be two sides to the stories, but there was but one side in the 
party that suffered at both places, and the single truth which is undenied that not a rebel or 
secessionist was hurt in either case, while from thirty to fifty negroes and Union white men 
were shot down precludes all doubt as to who did it and why it was done. 
Samuel Miller, Letter from Samuel Miller (Feb. 6, 1866) reprinted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at 
192. His continual juxtaposition of "negroes" and "Union white men" indicates that he perceived 
the problem of "freedom of the slave race" as necessitating protection of certain civil liberties for 
whites also. 
58. Oral Argument on heha!f of Defendant by S. W. Sanderson (Washington, 1883), at 24-25, 
reprinted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at 187. Fairman notes that after Slaughter-House, Miller 
did not suggest that "only discrimination against Negroes would be found to come within the 
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at 187. In Slaughter-House, 
he did not suggest that limitation either, except in reference to the equal protection clause. See 
infra note 63. It is possible to be misled in this by Miller's headnotes, but when read in full, the 
headnotes remain completely faithful to the text of the opinion. 
59. Slaughter-House, 21 L.Ed. at 395. The authorship appears only in the Lawyers' Edition. 
60. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
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National government, the provisions of the Constitution, or its 
laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof; and it is these which 
are placed under the protection of Congress by this clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.61 
By saying that the fourteenth amendment now "placed" the privileges 
and immunities of national citizenship under the protection of Con-
gress, Miller inferred that previously Congress did not have the power 
to protect them. 
Even more explicit is Miller's majority opinion in Bradwell v. 
State. The Court denied a woman's fourteenth amendment claim to 
freedom from sexual discrimination in her application to the Illinois 
state bar. Miller applied his test rigorously, but noted explicitly that 
the fourteenth amendment had transferred some powers to the federal 
government: 
[T]he right to control and regulate the granting of license to prac-
tice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are 
not transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and its 
exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of 
the United States in the party seeking such license.62 
Miller had no doubt whatsoever that the privileges or immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment had increased federal authority. 
C The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
Miller's interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause in 
Bradwell v. State clarifies his treatment of the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment in the Slaughter-House 
cases. The butchers had claimed that the monopoly deprived them of 
property without due process of law. Miller noted that neither federal 
nor state courts had ever considered labor to be property in this con-
text. He then dismissed the butchers' equal protection claim. Miller 
believed that only a strong case would bring anything except state ac-
tion against blacks within the reach of the equal protection clause.63 
61. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 37. 
62. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139 [emphasis added]. This case is usually cited as further evidence 
of the traditional interpretation of Slaughter-House, because Miller writes: 
[t]here are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, in that rela-
tion and character, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. 
But the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them. This right in 
no sense depends on citizenship of the United States. 
ld The mention of "relation and character" is appropriate once more because the right to admis-
sion to practice in a court really does flow from the government, much as do corporate rights. The 
mention of rights being "transferred" for their protection is sufficient to make it clear that Miller 
was not attempting merely to preserve the status quo. The specification that the right here "in no 
sense" depended on United States citizenship would distinguish it from the first eight 
amendments. 
63. As Miller wrote: 
We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination 
against negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the 
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These constructions seem ominously narrow to modem lawyers be-
cause expansive treatment of the language of these clauses has been so 
important in protecting personal liberties. But in Miller's eyes, his in-
terpretation was neither narrow nor antilibertarian. He firmly believed 
that the burden of the purpose of the fourteenth amendment rested on 
the privileges or immunities clause. 
D. The Concluding Section 
Miller closed the Slaughter-House opinion with a few reiterative 
comments. Miller concluded that the fourteenth amendment did not 
contain a legislative purpose to destroy the general features of the fed-
eral system. Prominent among these features was state authority to 
regulate civil rights and to protect the rights of person and property. 
The broad statement of the fourteenth amendment allowed for some 
overlap between federal and state authority and also transformed cer-
tain rights. The federal system, however, did not maintain that states 
would control all civil rights or personalliberties.64 Miller did say ex-
plicitly that the fourteenth amendment restricted states' powers, al-
though he was not necessarily referring to the privileges or immunities 
clause.65 
E. Miller's Quotations 
Miller's opinion was a moderate construction of the fourteenth 
amendment. This perception of his work should mollify the stringent 
criticism that Louis Lusky levelled at him. Lusky accused Miller of 
purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a 
strong case would be necessary for its application to any other. 
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 80-81. Regardless of the quotability of this passage, it should not be 
used to characterize Miller's construction of the whole fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., J. BAER, 
supra note 2, at 107. Miller was here referring only to the equal protection clause; he talked 
immediately before about laws discriminating against blacks as a class and immediately after 
about "denial of equal justice." 
64. Regarding the federal system, Miller noted: 
The second clause protects from the hostile legislation of the States the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States [emphasis in original) as distinguished from the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the States. 
These latter, as defined by Justice Washington in Coifield v. Coryell, and by this court in 
Ward v. Maryland, embrace generally those fundamental civil rights for the security and es-
tablishment of which organized society is instituted, and they remain, with certain exceptions 
mentioned in the Federal Consritution, under the care of the state governments. 
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). 
65. Miller stated: 
[W]e do not see in those Amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general 
system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen 
have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local govern-
ment, including the regulation of civil rights, the rights of person and of property, was essen-
tial to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought 
proper to impose additional limitations on the states, and to confer additional power on that 
of the Nation. 
ld at 82. 
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deliberately misquoting sources to nullify the fourteenth amendment.66 
Miller did misquote, but only to update his sources. Misquoting is not 
good academic or judicial practice, but neither is it diabolical. Analysis 
of the misquotations clarifies Miller's opinion. 
Miller purposely misquoted the comity clause by substituting "of" 
for "in" in the fhrase "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States."6 Neither the parties nor the dissenting Justices made 
the same mistake; Justice Bradley even noted Miller's error.68 Lusky 
asserted that the change allowed Miller to formulate his dual citizen-
ship theory and to avoid any implication of article IV, section 2 funda-
mental rights held by individuals precisely as citizens of the United 
States prior to the fourteenth amendment.69 In fact, this change only 
helped Miller to assimilate C01jield to the analysis. He could have as-
similated C01jield in other ways. Nor was Corjield as crucial to Miller's 
argument as Lusky thought. Even Bradley noted that the mistake 
merely encapsulated the Court's traditional interpretation.70 Had 
Miller quoted correctly, his opinion might have been modestly longer, 
but the misquotation was not necessary to his analysis. He was merely 
engaging in the admittedly reprehensible practice of updating constitu-
tional language to convey better the traditional interpretation. 
In addition to misquoting the Constitution, Miller did not quote 
Corjield completely. He closed the quotation before Justice Washing-
ton's mention of "the right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or 
to reside in, any other state" as a fundamental right.71 Lusky argued 
that, since the right to travel is a federal right, inclusion of the right to 
travel in the Corjield quotation would have rendered nonsensical 
Miller's use of that case.72 Miller's concern, however, was different. 
His own opinion in Crandall v. Nevada had already made travel for a 
national purpose a federal right. The Corjield language listing article 
IV section, 2 privileges and immunities was thus outdated. Other as-
pects of the right to travel, including the general Corjield right, would 
have presented a problem on which Miller was not inclined to rule.73 
66. Lusky stated: 
The Miller interpretation limited almost to zero the power of Congress, under the three Civil 
War Amendments, to intervene in the relations of a state with its citizens in order to prevent a 
national interest from being subverted as a result of hostility or indifference on the part of 
state and local officials. 
See L. LuSKY, supra note 2, at 193. Lusky disclaims the ad hominem argument, but that is difficult 
to believe after he accused Miller of intellectual dishonesty. /d at 197. Lusky produced seven 
propositions su=arizing Slaughter-House; of these seven, propositions two, three, and seven are 
stated incorrectly. See id at 191-92. 
67. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2. 
68. 83 U.S. at 117. 
69. L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 194-95. 
70. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 117-18. 
71. 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
72. See L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 195-96. 
73. Regarding his disinclination to rule, Miller wrote: 
We have given every opportunity for a full hearing at the bar; we have discussed freely and 
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By considering the right to travel, the Court would have widen~d the 
scope of the case and possibly would have raised the issue of the 
unenumerated rights of the ninth amendment.74 Giving a wider scope 
to the fourteenth amendment would have overturned the character of 
the federal system, a decision Miller would not make without explicit 
constitutional mandate. For Miller, Corjield only demonstrated that 
states had significant independent duties regarding some fundamental 
rights. He limited the quotation to avoid complications that would 
have involved wider determinations, not to avoid matters that would 
have invalidated his use of Corjield 
Lusky conveniently neglected to note a further omission in the 
Corjield language that reinforces this relatively benign theory about 
Miller's handling of sources. Miller quoted Corjield's general defini-
tion of fundamental rights of state citizenship but omitted "the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty" as a fundamental privilege. 75 Had Miller used 
Corjield to reach the conclusions asserted by Lusky, Miller would have 
included that phrase in the quotation as a privilege of state citizenship. 
But the life and liberty protections embodied in the first eight amend-
ments and in article I, section 9 were now protected-so Miller 
thought-against state action. Miller thus omitted that clause from the 
middle of the quotation because protection of those fundamental privi-
leges and immunities no longer depended on the states. Only a desire 
compared views among ourselves; we have taken ample time for careful deliberation, and we 
now propose to announce the judgments which we have formed on the construction of these 
articles, so far as we have found them necessary to the decision before us, and beyond that we 
have neither the inclination nor the right to go. 
83 U.S. at 67. 
74. Miller did not address the question of whether the fourteenth amendment would affect 
the ninth amendment. The argument for incorporating ninth amendment rights is that unenumer-
ated rights were being denied or disparaged precisely because they were unenumerated. Miller 
argued that fundamentality was not the test, and that the states still protected some rights that 
were every bit as fundamental as those the federal government protected. The enumeration deter-
mined only a jurisdictional question, and there was no reason to suspect-given equal protection 
of the law~hat states would be any more oppressive in the future regarding unenumerated 
rights than they had been at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. The incorporation of the 
ninth amendment would have defeated the general nature of the federal government as one of 
delegated powers. Rejection of the test of fundamentality and preservation of the ninth amend-
ment and the character of the federal government as a government of delegated powers are essen-
tial to preserve the stringent character of individual liberties, if constitutional law is to proceed 
logically. 
75. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 76. The relevant portion of Corjield with omissions indi-
cated in brackets is as follows: 
What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to 
enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: 
Protection by the government[; the enjoyment of life and liberty], with the right to acquire 
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject 
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of 
the whole. [The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, 
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of 
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the 
state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from 
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state.] 
6 F. Cas. at 551-52. 
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to update rather than a dishonest urge to conceal can be consistent with 
this omission. Miller regarded Coljield not as an authority that vali-
dated his argument, but as a source of good language and a point of 
common understanding. 
Miller likewise studiously avoided using the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 to interpret the fourteenth amendment.76 Miller did incorrectly 
state that Congress had never attempted to define the rights of United 
States citizens even though the 1866 Act was undeniably such an at-
tempt. Miller's exclusion of the 1866 Act, however, is bothersome only 
if one assumes he was dishonest. Two other perhaps nonexclusive pos-
sibilities are conceivable. Miller may have viewed the movement re-
sulting in the 1866 Act as culminating in the fourteenth amendment, so 
that the 1866 Act was not an independent effort to define the rights of 
citizenship. More likely, however, Miller perceived that the wide-
spread conviction that the 1866 Act was unconstitutional necessitated 
the fourteenth amendment.77 The enactment of the fourteenth amend-
ment could be taken-properly or improperly-as affirming the view 
that the Act was unconstitutional and should be ignored. The allega-
tions of dishonesty, then, come to nothing, because Miller's argument 
gained nothing from the misquotations. If anything, the Coljield mis-
quotation supports a more favorable interpretation of Miller's 
intentions. 
Miller rested his analysis of Slaughter-House primarily on the 
privileges or immunities clause. His historical perceptions defined the 
general direction the Court would follow with these amendments. 
Searching analysis of the wording of the fourteenth amendment fo-
cused attention on the close definition of "privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States" as distinct from those of a citizen of a 
state. He rejected fundamentality as the basic test for fourteenth 
amendment protection and chose instead the "existence and protec-
tion" test. That choice allowed Miller to preserve exclusive state juris-
diction over a substantial range of civil rights matters while still 
accomplishing the purpose of the fourteenth amendment. He neverthe-
less shaped his opinion to the individual case. The transformation of 
the first eight amendments and article I, section 9 into restrictions 
against the states awaited a relevant case. When such a case, Cruik-
shank, came before the Court, however, Waite abandoned Miller's rea-
soning. But the Slaughter-House opinion remains as an argument that 
must be taken seriously. Slaughter-House, while not a monumental 
achievement of judicial clarity, is a persuasive interpretation of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
76. See L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 196. 
77. /d. at 197. 
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Ill. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE: THE DISSENTS 
In Slaughter-House, Justices Field and Bradley argued for a 
revolution in the relationship between state and federal governments. 
Prior to the fourteenth amendment, state governments possessed inher-
ent authority, whereas the federal government exercised only delegated 
powers. It is only minor exaggeration to say that the Field-Bradley 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment would have made the fed-
eral government a government of inherent authority. Their dissents ex-
plicitly relegated states to incidental status. Unlike Miller, Field and 
Bradley had no qualms about using one amendment to change the 
whole structure of American government. They are called Radical 
Republicans for a reason. 
A. Justice Field's Dissent 
Field agreed with much of Miller's method, even in some areas 
where modem commentators would disagree with Miller. He agreed 
on the importance of Coifielt:f78 and of the citizenship clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.79 Likewise, he agreed that the fourteenth 
amendment created no new rights.80 He also agreed that the privileges 
or immunities language of the fourteenth amendment and of the com-
ity clause must have similar meanings and similar effects. Justice Field 
even settled for an "existence and protection" test. Given such agree-
ment on the factors shaping his dissent, Field's almost total opposition 
to Miller may seem surprising. Unlike Miller, Field believed that 
through the fourteenth amendment the federal government assumed 
ultimate responsibility for all civil and personal rights of its citizens. 
Field, like Miller, said that the outcome of the case ·depended on 
the recent constitutional amendments, and particularly on the four-
teenth amendment. Because Field ultimately concluded that the fed-
eral government could right any infringement whatsoever of a citizen's 
fundamental privileges or immunities, he first demonstrated that the 
butchers had suffered a legal wrong. He acknowledged states' inherent 
police powers but maintained that the state exhausted its powers by 
providing for the inspection of meat and prohibiting the slaughtering of 
animals except below the city of New Orleans. To Field, any further 
legislative grant was unnecessary and unreasonable.81 Nor could the 
state rely on any alleged similarity to grants of monopolies for bridges, 
ferries, and similar services. These latter grants had a public character; 
slaughtering animals, on the other hand, was merely an ordinary pri-
vate economic calling. Rhetorically, Field opined that, if the Slaughter-
78. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 97; see i'!fra note 86 and accompanying text. 
79. 83 U.S. at 95; see infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
80. 83 U.S. at 96 (''The Amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immu-
nities upon citizens. . . ."). 
81. 83 U.S. at 87. See also W. NELSON, supra note 12, at 151. 
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House grant was allowed to stand, states could ban in perpetuity any 
ordinary calling. Having thus faced Armageddon, he tried to erect a 
fourteenth amendment protection against deprivation of such rights. 82 
Field's analysis of the citizenship clause departed significantly 
from Miller's. Dred Scott was indeed part of the essential background 
to understanding the clause by declaring that "people" in the Constitu-
tion did not mean "people" but "citizens," with the result that blacks 
could not be citizens in the sense used in the Constitution. Field was 
unwilling to abide by that result. He said that the fourteenth amend-
ment recognized, rather than created, a United States citizenship dis-
tinct from state citizenship. That recognition accorded priority to 
United States citizenship and relegated state citizenship to incidental 
status. A citizen of a state was merelf a United States citizen who hap-
pened to reside in a particular area. 3 
By relegating state citizenship to incidental status, Field achieved a 
far-reaching effect for the privileges or immunities clause. All funda-
mental privileges or immunities of a free man or citizen were trans-
formed and now derived from a person's status as a United States 
citizen. The states, being only incidental in nature, could in no way 
impair any of those rights. Residence in a given state would have as 
little relevance to important rights as residence in any given town. 
Since the rights no longer depended on the state, no longer owed their. 
existence and protection to the state, the rights were no longer within 
the exclusive control of the state. 84 Field thus turned the "existence 
and protection" test against state control after putting a different and 
revolutionary emphasis on the citizenship clause. Field next used rhet-
oric to justify his far-reaching conclusion. What had occasioned, he 
asked, all the commotion surrounding the amendment if such a change 
had not been intended? And for what other purpose could it have 
82. 83 U.S. at 88-89. 
83. Field stated: 
The first clause of the founeenth Amendment changes this whole subject, and removes it 
from the region of discussion and doubt. It reco~izes in express terms, if it does not create, 
citizens of the United States, and it makes their Citizenship dependent upon the place of their 
binh, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any state or the 
condition of their ancestry. A citizen of a state is now only a citizen of the United States 
residing in that state. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to 
him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and 
are not dependent upon his citizenship of any state. The exercise of these rights and privi-
leges, and the degree of enjoyment received from such exercise, are always more or less af-
fected by the condition and the local institutions of the state, or city, or town where he resides. 
They are thus affected in a state by the wisdom of its laws, the ability of its officers, the 
efficiency of its magistrates, the education and morals of its people, and by many other con-
siderations. This is a result which follows from the constitution of society, and can never be 
avoided, but in no other way can they be affected by the action of the state, or by the resi-
dence of the citizen therein. They do not derive their existence from its legislation, and can-
not be destroyed by its power. 
Jd at 95-96. This passage is quite explicit in maintaining that state governments are no more 
relevant to essential rights than are town governments. Field would thereby demolish the federal 
structure in favor of a purely national government. 
84. Jd 
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been drafted?85 
Field then discussed the definitional and operational continuity 
between the comity clause and the fourteenth amendment. He applied 
the Coljield list of fundamental rights directly to the privileges or im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Since civil and personal 
rights no longer depended on the states, the Coljieldlist of the rights of 
state citizenship was no longer relevant for article IV, section 2 deter-
minations. Rather, Coljield was a guide to defining the privileges or 
immunities of United States citizens. Field reinforced this conclusion 
by referring to the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866-the 
forerunner of the fourteenth amendment-and by the traditional 
Coljield interpretation of the comity clause. 86 
The operational continuity between the comity clause and the 
fourteenth amendment mandated an extensive federal jurisdiction. 
The comity clause had protected citizens of state A from the hostile and 
discriminatory legislation of state B. For Field, the fourteenth amend-
ment operated in the same way. Since state citizenship was incidental, 
the fourteenth amendment would forbid discrimination between any 
two United States citizens regardless of any consideration of state citi-
zenship. Field's analysis dictated that no state could create a monopoly 
that unreasonably excluded citizens from an ordinary calling. 
Field thus almost reversed the roles of state and federal govern-
ments. Under his view, all state legislation would be open to federal 
review; no state could impair the liberties of its citizens, regardless of 
motivation or equal treatment. Field's view would have revolutionized 
the entire structure of the federal system. The privileges or immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment would transform and universalize 
the comity clause and thereby eliminate states as centers of social 
policy.87 
Field's deductions followed quickly from his interpretation of the 
85. Field wrote: 
If this inhibition has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but only 
refers, as held by the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities 
as were before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as 
belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accom-
plished nothing and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage. 
Jd at 96. By rights that were "specially designated in the Constitution" Field may have been 
thinking of those rights specified in article I, § 10. Miller's mention of the rights he derived from 
the Constitution indicates that Field was wrong in this interpretation of the majority opinion. 
86. See id at 97-98. 
87. In the Slaughter-House case, Field stated: 
What the clause in question did for the protection of the citizens of one state against hostile 
and discriminating legislation of other states, the 14th Amendment does for the protection of 
every citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation, against him in 
favor of others whether they reside in the same or in different states. If under the 4th article 
of the Constitution, equality of privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of dif-
ferent states, under the 14th Amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the 
United States. 
ld at 100-01. Here again it is apparent that Field was eliminating state borders as relevant to 
fundamental rights. 
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fourteenth amendment clauses. English common ·law and the civil 
law-this was a Louisiana case-both classified freedom from unrea-
sonable monopolies as a civil right. The federal government had the 
authority under the fourteenth amendment to right all state-committed 
wrongs that affected important civil rights. The Slaughter-House mo-
nopoly thus violated the fourteenth amendment.88 Field closed with a 
ringing assertion of the character of United States citizenship: "This 
equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial en-
actments, in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout the whole country, is 
the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States."89 The ide-
alism is attractive, but its value as constitutional interpretation is ques-
tionable. Field intended to transform into a federal right every 
important right, privilege, and immunity held by an individual against 
state activities. The Supreme Court would have become a perpetual 
censor of all state acts; Congress would have had legislative compe-
tence in every sphere but the trivial. 
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B. Justice Bradley's Dissent 
Bradley's dissent reinforced Field's, but his treatment of the enu-
merated rights, of the rights of inhabitants of territories, and of the ef-
fects of the radical position deserve separate comment. His exhaustive 
list of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights and the right 
to habeas corpus procedure provided clear support for a theory of in-
corporation.90 But Bradley was no precursor of Justice Black; he did 
not believe in incorporation. The enumeration of the rights was incon-
sequential. For Bradley, the privileges or immunities clause protected 
all civil and personal liberties equally.91 Bradley wanted to use the 
fourteenth amendment to restructure completely governmental 
relations.92 
Bradley's most intriguing argument concerns the nature of the 
rights of inhabitants of federal territories and those made citizens by 
naturalization or annexation of territory before they became citizens of 
a state. Like angels for medieval philosophers, territorial inhabitants 
88. /d at 101-09. 
89. Id at 109-10. 
90. Bradley stated: 
But others of the greatest consequence were enumerated, although they were only secured, in 
express terms, from invasion by the Federal government; such as the right of habeas corpus, 
the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a 
free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, the right to 
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and above all, and including almost all 
the rest, the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
These, and still others are specified in the original Constitution or in the early amendments of 
it, as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or, what is still 
stronger for the force of the argument, the rights of all persons, whether citizens or not. 
Id at 118-19. 
91. /d at 119. ("But even if the Constitution were silent, the fundamental privileges and 
immunities of citizens, as such, would be no less real and no less inviolable than they now are.") 
92. See id at 123. See also W. NELSON, supra note II, at 71. 
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presented the crucial problem in a pure form. In the majority opinion, 
Miller considered the issue and settled it only as far as it impinged on 
his own argument. For Miller, the fourteenth amendment overturned 
the prior doctrine that individuals had federal rights only by virtue of 
state citizenship. Under the prior doctrine, if territorial inhabitants 
were not state citizens, they had none of the enumerated rights.93 In his 
dissent, Bradley maintained otherwise and agreed with Field that there 
had always been a distinct citizenship of the United States. The privi-
leges or immunities of United States citizens could be ascertained by 
examining the acknowledged privileges or immunities of inhabitants of 
territories who were United States citizens but not citizens of a state.94 
Miller did not argue that the status of the rights of territorial in-
habitants after the fourteenth amendment was relevent to Slaughter-
House, which concerned a right not enumerated in the Constitution. 
But as an index for post-fourteenth amendment privileges and immuni-
ties of United States citizens, the status of territorial inhabitants would 
seem a determinative argument. The privileges or immunities neces-
sarily enjoyed by such citizens include habeas corpus and the first eight 
amendments as privileges or immunities of United States citizens. Al-
though Bradley's argument was not determinative in Slaughter-House, 
he made Miller confront the problem squarely. This argument is a fur-
ther reason for believing that at the time of Slaughter-House Miller 
would have included the first eight amendments and the various rele-
vant portions of article I, section 9 within the protection of the privi-
leges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Bradley, despite his superficial agreement with Miller on this 
point, was a radical. He supported the butchers on the basis of the 
privileges or immunities clause, the due process clause, and the equal 
protection clause. He castigated Miller for a restrictive reading of the 
due process clause95 and implied that Miller wanted to nullify the 
amendment. That implication served as a counterpoise to Bradley's 
defense of the radical position. He admitted that some feared that the 
radical interpretation would lead to massive congressional intervention 
in the internal affairs of the states. He dismissed those fears by assert-
ing that the courts, not Congress, would normally handle the relevant 
matters. The fundamental rights, in his view, would soon become so 
well known that little litigation would arise. The fourteenth amend-
ment would largely be self-executing.96 
Bradley's capacity for optimism was extraordinary. Modem law-
yers will see Miller's caution about federal power to review state legis-
lation on the grounds of reasonableness as a much more realistic 
93. 83 U.S. at 72-73. 
94. Jd at 119. 
95. Jd at 122-23. 
96. Jd at 123-24. 
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evaluation of the probable effects of Bradley's construction. But Brad-
ley's portrayal of Miller's opinion made it easier for later courts to read 
Miller's opinion very superficially. Bradley-and more so, Justice 
Swayne97-clarified the radical nature of the dissents. 
C The Majority-Dissent D!fferences 
The difference between the majority and the dissenting opinions in 
Slaughter-House is not the difference between a complete nullification 
of the amendment and a reasoned implementation. Miller's interpreta-
tion was moderate. His construction flows from the language of the 
amendment itself and from certain assumptions shared with the dis-
senters. It reflects a realistic purpose for the fourteenth amendment 
and uses the privileges or immunities clause in an expansive role to 
secure liberties that attach to United States citizenship. But without 
explicit language authorizing so radical a change, Miller refused to use 
the fourteenth amendment to restructure completely the federal system. 
The dissenters would have used the fourteenth amendment as a lever 
for exactly that purpose. State governments would no longer have 
served as a check on federal authority. Even Justice Bradley did not 
really deny that far-reaching consequences could occur as a result of 
the radical construction. He only said that such things would not hap-
pen, not that they could not. Miller's realism was far more sensible. 
IV. CRUIKSHANK 
A. Background 
United States v. Cruikshan/(J8 accomplished the nullification of the 
fourteenth amendment that scholars traditionally attribute to Slaugh-
ter-House. Chief Justice Waite, not a member of the Slaughter-House 
Court, wrote the opinion. He misread Slaughter-House and began his 
analysis on the principle that state and federal privileges and immuni-
ties were absolutely distinct. Without directly analyzing the fourteenth 
amendment, he derived a multiplicity of jurisdictionally defined rights. 
This approach was suggested by and was appropriate to corporate 
rights, but was not appropriate for those rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights. Waite thereby deviated from the traditional approach that in-
sisted that individuals had inherent liberties which did not derive from 
governmental grants. Cruikshank has neither the moderation nor the 
modest respectability of Slaughter-House. 
97. See id at 124-30. Swayne's dissent adds little to the argument. He would have placed 
the analytic burden on the due process clause, particularly on the meaning of "liberty" and "prop-
erty." He forthrightly acknowledged the revolutionary effect of his construction. Id at 129. ("It 
is objected that the power conferred is novel and large. The answer is that the novelty was known 
and the measure deliberately adopted. The power is beneficient in its nature, and cannot be 
abused.") 
98. 92 u.s. 542 (1876). 
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Cruikshank, another Louisiana case, concerned a sixteen-count in-
dictment under the Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870. The prose-
cution alleged that the defendants banded together and conspired to 
deprive black citizens of their constitutional rights. The only rights 
specifically named in the indictment were assembly, petition, and the 
bearing of arms.99 The rights of assembly and petition were precisely 
those rights listed in Slaughter-House as privileges or immunities of 
United States citizens. The Supreme Court quashed the indictment for 
insufficient specificity, and the analysis correctly focused on whether 
the fourteenth amendment guaranteed the rights listed in the 
indictment. 
Waite wanted to demonstrate the distinction between state and 
federal governments. Accordingly, he wrote in terms of powers, argu-
ing that there was absolutely no overlap between state and federal pow-
ers. 100 He concluded that the duty to protect was strictly limited by the 
power possessed. 101 Waite's stress on the duty to protect indicates the 
more restrictive interpretation he followed. Justice Waite used the 
analogy of the situation in which a single act made a person amenable 
to both federal and state jurisdictions, such as a breach of the peace by 
resisting a federal officer serving process within a state jurisdiction. 
That dual liability, he explained, did not indicate any overlap of pow-
ers; it derived solely from different aspects of that act. To Waite, the 
aspects of the act were completely different in character. 102 Thus, he 
concluded that there was a necessary and absolute divergence between 
the rights of a state citizen and those of a United States citizen. 
B. Aspect Analysis 
Waite analyzed the subject matter of the indictments by dividing 
99. Id at 548. 
100. In Bradwell, the coun uses power terminology. See 83 U.S. at 139. See supra note 62 
and accompanying text. 
101. As Waite concluded: 
The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a 
State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those 
he has under the other. . . . The duty of a government to afford protection is limited always 
by the power it possesses for that purpose. 
92 U.S. at 549. He added: "The people of the United States resident within any State are subject 
to two governments: one State, and the other National; but there need be no conflict between the 
two. The powers which one possesses, the other does not." Id at 550. 
102. Waite noted: 
True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and 
the same act. Thus, if a Marshal of the United States is unlawfully resisted while executing 
the process of the courts within a State, and the resistance is accompanied by an assault on 
the officer, the sovereignty of the United States is violated by the resistance, and that of the 
State by the breach of peace, in the assault. . . . This does not, however, necessarily imply 
that the two governments possess powers in common, or bring them into conflict with each 
other .... No rights can be acquired under the Constitution or laws of the United States, 
except such as the Government of the United States has the authority to grant or secure. All 
that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the protection of the States. 
Id at 550-51. 
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each right into its component aspects. He identified, for example, 
three different rights of peaceable assembly (or petition or bearing 
arms). There was the first amendment right: the privilege or immunity 
of a United States citizen to assemble peaceably without interference 
from the United States government or its officials. As explained previ-
ously, 103 the only way a state could interfere with this right which was 
directed only against the federal government, was to grant the federal 
government the power to interfere with individuals attempting to as-
semble peaceably. Since the adoption of the first amendment, of 
course, this aspect of the right to assemble peaceably was secure against 
state action. 
The second right of assembly was assembly for a national pur-
pose.104 This right did not come from any provision in the Constitu-
tion, the Bill of Rights, or the fourteenth amendment. It came from the 
necessities of the national government, as in Crandall 105 This variety 
of assembly was only a relatively small proportion of all possible as-
semblies: the purpose of the assembly had to be related to the national 
government, such as an assembly to petition the national government 
about a grievance. The second right of assembly, however, was pro-
tected both against state action (as it would be through the fourteenth 
amendment) and against all and sundry. 106 This additional scope of 
protection reinforced its distinction from the first amendment right. 
This right, closely related to the analysis in Crandall, did not need four-
teenth amendment protection, although the fourteenth amendment 
might provide a convenient source for further protection. These first 
two rights of assembly antedated the fourteenth amendment, but were 
the only rights of assembly Waite acknowledged as being held by citi-
zens of the United States. Therefore, under Waite's analysis, the four-
teenth amendment had been only declaratory in this regard. 
The third right of assembly was the general right, that is, assembly 
for all purposes other than federal, and protection against interference 
by both fellow citizens and state governments. 107 Waite maintained 
that this aspect of the right of assembly was not a privilege or immunity 
of a United States citizen, because, utilizing the Slaughter-House 
103. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
104. 92 U.S. at 552-53. 
105. See supra notes 46, 53 and accompanying text. 
106. Regarding the right to assemble, the opinion stated: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a 
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the 
National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protec-
tion of and guarantied [sic] by, the United States .... If it had been alleged in these counts 
that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would 
have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States. 
92 U.S. at 552-53. This means that by a Cruikshank interpretation, such an assembly is under the 
protection of the federal government against all and sundry, not just against state action. The 
protection, however, does not originally derive from the fourteenth amendment. 
107. Jd at 552. 
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"existence and protection" test, the right fell under the protective pow-
ers of the states. Waite fortified this conclusion by referring to the rule 
in Gibbons v. Ogden: if the power had not been delegated to the federal 
government, it remained with the states. 108 Waite therefore concluded 
that the general right of peaceable assembly remained a right of state 
citizenship, outside the protective scope of the fourteenth amendment. 
After dividing the rights according to their different jurisdictional 
aspects, Waite subjected each of these "mini-rights" to the Slaughter-
House test. But here, Waite refrained completely from quoting the 
fourteenth amendment. He did not base his argument on the language 
of the privileges or immunities clause. He made no attempt to explain 
the privileges or immunities clause or the comity clause. Waite quoted 
the fourteenth amendment only when considering equal protection and 
due process rights. 109 
Justice Waite chose to ignore the careful analysis in Slaughter-
House. He only cited Slaughter-House, inaccurately, to support his as-
sertion that the rights of state and United States citizens necessarily 
diverged absolutely. 110 As a result, he based Cruikshank on a mere 
impression derived from Slaughter-House. Because aspect analysis 
would leave the privileges and immunities of United States citizens un-
changed from what they were prior to the fourteenth amendment, 
Waite managed to deprive the clause of all significance. He thus re-
jected the force Slaughter-House had found in the fourteenth amend-
ment and adopted the conservative portion of the Slaughter-House 
analysis that only made sense with a powerful privileges or immunities 
clause. Under Waite's aspect analysis, the conclusion of the case was 
inevitable. The Court held that the indictments in Cruikshank did not 
allege interference with any right of United States citizenship. 
C The Character o.f Rights 
Waite's characterization of rights and the conclusions he drew 
from that characterization were severely flawed. His use of aspect 
analysis yielded an inadequate perception of American rights. Juris-
dictionally defined rights-the mini-rights of his opinion-were the 
equivalent of government-granted rights, a conceptualization com-
pletely contrary to the perception of rights in late eighteenth-century 
America. Moreover, even on its own terms, Waite's argument was 
carelessly drawn and lacking in insight. But the opinion did corre-
spond to the lawyer's instinct to regard rights in relation to the jurisdic-
tion and thus to ignore rights when jurisdiction is absent. The sole 
virtue of that approach, however, is the restraint it puts on lawyers, 
who must function within a given jurisdictional system; the pragmatism 
108. ld at 551-52. 
109. See id at 549. 
110. See id at 554. 
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of the approach prevents wastefull expenditure of client's resources. 
Convenience and pragmatism, nevertheless, do not always yield correct 
constitutional interpretation. They certainly did not here. 
Rights can either be conceptualized as inherent or as granted by 
government; Waite's choice of jurisdictionally defined rights opted for 
the latter. But late eighteenth-century Americans would have rejected 
vehemently any formulation that made rights derivative of governmen-
tal provisions. To the significant extent that the colonists fought the 
Revolutionary War to secure liberty, they were fighting to maintain 
rights that the British government did not protect, that the government 
had not granted the colonies. Americans decisively rejected the idea 
that rights only derived from governmental grants. That rejection en-
tailed the acceptance of a view of rights based on natural law and thus 
inherent in individuals. The acceptance of this conceptualization was 
the major and probably the sole contribution of natural law to the 
Constitution. 
For Americans' personal rights inhered in individuals and were 
thus decisively different from corporate rights. Rights to assemble 
peaceably, to petition, and to bear arms were unitary, not fragmented 
rights. They were merely protected in different ways by different gov-
ernmental bodies. Even today that perception remains; it appears regu-
larly when Americans evaluate foreign governments as oppressive. If 
rights are inherent, aspect analysis is intrinsically improper. 
Cruikshank's success derives at least in part from the way in which 
Waite used classical theory in his analysis. That the Bill of Rights ac-
ted as a restraint only on the federal government was venerable doc-
trine. Waite reasoned that, because the federal government was a 
government of delegated powers and not a government of inherent au-
thority, the designed rights eliminated any authority. The rights enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights were merely exceptions to powers. 111 If 
the Bill of Rights worked merely to cut powers short, to eradicate com-
pletely federal power in certain areas, and to put an absolute limit on 
the extent of national power, then the Bill of Rights could not act as a 
grant of power. 112 It could not act as an authorization to the federal 
government to protect the various enumerated rights. Thus far, Waite's 
argument could not be faulted. It is in fact improper to talk of rights as 
trumps to powers except in regard to a government of inherent author-
ity. Trumping implies that the government has the power to act in an 
area unless an adversely affected party objects. There are, however, 
areas in which the federal government simply has no power to act, re-
gardless of the quiescence of those affected. 113 Treatment of the 
Ill. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 912 (1971) (amend-
ments proposed by New York), 1029-31 (Madison proposing the amendments to Congress). 
112. 92 U.S. at 551-52. 
113. P. 80BBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL fATE 146 (1982). 
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liberties in the Bill of Rights as exceptions to powers had an impeccable 
ancestry. 
Waite based his test for fourteenth amendment protection directly 
on that analysis, without considering the purpose of the fourteenth 
amendment, the analogy to article 4, section 2, or the analysis of 
Slaughter-House. Waite demanded that a right be created, be pro-
tected, and receive guaranteed, continuous protection from the federal 
government to be accorded fourteenth amendment privileges or immu-
nities status. 114 That test was functionally equivalent to the Slaughter-
House test, although it reflected the Paul v. Virginia origins of the 
Slaughter-House test; 115 now amplified by Waite's preference for juris-
dictionally defined rights, it adhered slightly more to a corporate for-
mulation. Classical theory, then, forbade thinking about the Bill of 
Rights as a grant of powers. The classical approach reinforced aspect 
analysis which distinguished between the general right and the right as 
against the federal government. Application of the test yielded the 
plausible conclusion that the general rights-of assembly, petition, or 
bearing of arms-gained no further security from the Bill of Rights. 
Therefore, the general right remained unaffected by the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Waite discussed the matter of general rights only in an easy con-
text: an individual whose rights had been violated. Any affected indi-
vidual had to sort through the various jurisdictions for the appropriate 
forum. He would find no help in federal courts for infringements of 
the general right (at least under aspect analysis or before the fourteenth 
amendment). Waite admitted willingly that a single act could render a 
person amenable to both state and federal jurisdictions. Thus, a fed-
eral officer could breach the peace, a state offense, while interfering 
with a peaceable assembly, a federal offense. That different aspects of 
a single act could constitute different offenses in different jurisdictions 
seemed compatible with legal practice and was thus acceptable to 
lawyers. 
Even granting his theoretical assumptions, however, Waite's anal-
ysis was incorrect. The general rights received additional protection 
from having been enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The federal gov-
ernment acts on states as well as on individuals. One of the problems 
114. Waite stated: 
[We must) ascertain whether the several rights ... are such as had been in law and in fact 
granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States .... It was not, there-
fore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution. The Government of the United States, 
when established, found it in existence, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford 
it protection. . . . The right was not created by the Amendment; neither was its continuance 
guarantied [sic], except as against congressional interference. This is not a right granted by 
the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent uron that instrument for its 
existence. 
ld at 551-53. Waite then defined the claimed rights as arising under internal police powers. 
115. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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that necessitated the Bill of Rights was the possibility that federal op-
pression of individuals could nullify states as independent centers of 
social policy. Such action was possible through any of the delegated 
powers; James Madison utilized the examples of the powers to tax and 
to make treaties. Under the former, prior to the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights, Congress might have authorized the use of general warrants. 116 
Under the latter, the federal government might have abolished the 
right to bear arms or might have established a religion to appease an 
enemy. 117 Such federal action would have abolished the general rights. 
The first and second amendments, however, precluded any such federal 
action. The Bill of Rights thus provided additional protection for the 
general rights. This additional protection would not have made the fed-
eral government the primary protector of these rights. Under Waite's 
analysis, until the fourteenth amendment, states still could have re-
stricted such rights of their own citizens. Nevertheless, Waite was 
clearly wrong when he asserted that these rights gained no additional 
security from the federal constitution.U 8 Even under Waite's analysis, 
then, the enumerated rights in the Constitution should have been privi-
leges and immunities of United States citizens in the sense required for 
fourteenth amendment protection. 
The argument for incorporating the enumerated liberties is even 
stronger if the right is an inherent unitary right. A test that requires 
determining which entity created the right causes problems, but only 
because it is an inappropriate test for inherent rights. The first and 
second amendments certainly protected and guaranteed the rights al-
leged in Cruikshank. As long as those amendments survived, at least 
one portion of the rights would be enforced and would constitute a part 
of the political heritage. People would be immune from interference by 
the federal government and undoubtedly would feel wronged when 
treated more oppressively by state governments than by the federal 
government. Even without the fourteenth amendment, jurisdictional 
differences in standards would inevitably create discontent; state gov-
ernments would have difficulty eradicating those liberties. And if the 
right is unitary, protection of the right in certain situations must be 
construed as protection of the right generally. The problem becomes 
tautological. Waite, however, discarded the notion of inherent rights 
and did not consider the crucial situations. As a result, Cruikshank is a 
decision of little intellectual merit. 
D. The Holding 
Waite concluded the decision by quashing all sixteen indictments. 
The decision was not controversial within the Court: the sole dissent 
116. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note Ill, at 1030-31. 
117. Id at 1088. 
118. See 92 U.S. at 552. 
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was a concurrence. Field, Bradley, and Swayne were all still Justices 
and chose not to dissent. Perhaps the lack of specificity in the indict-
ments seemed a good reason to quash them. 119 The unanimity on the 
ultimate conclusion, however, created a deficient analysis. Only a su-
perficial interpretation of Slaughter-House, followed by poor analysis, 
could result in excluding the enumerated liberties from fourteenth 
amendment protection. Ironically, Waite managed, under the banner 
of Slaughter-House, to exclude the examples that Miller had named in 
dictum as appropriate privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States. 
One might think that Miller's silence in Cruikshank amounted to 
tacit consent. It is more likely, given the lack of dissenting opinions 
from Field, Bradley, and Swayne, that the case simply did not seem an 
appropriate field of battle. Unfortunately, Waite's opinion determined 
the subsequent direction of the Court. The Cruikshank analysis sur-
vived as the authoritative interpretation of Slaughter-House. 120 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legal analysis grafts new conclusions onto existing lines of con-
struction, often inappropriately. In Cruikshank, Waite was unusually 
successful in that endeavor. Both the obscurity of Miller's Slaughter-
House opinion and the dissent's characterization of Miller's approach 
reinforced Waite's analysis. After Cruikshank, of course, the crucial 
question for practicing lawyers was not what Slaughter-House actually 
said, but which construction of Slaughter-House the Court was actually 
following. That pragmatic feature of legal analysis leads away from 
constitutional meaning. Court-established tests assume a decided supe-
riority to constitutional language. Waite did not reexamine the privi-
leges or immunities clause. Slaughter-House had done that. The first 
case, misunderstood and unexamined, shielded subsequent cases from 
the force of the fourteenth amendment's language. Waite avoided the 
fourteenth amendment language and concentrated instead on the es-
tablished test and general governmental theory. 
In Slaughter-House, Miller had no such shield. He felt bound to 
give the privileges or immunities clause a substantial meaning related 
to the purpose for which it was adopted. He believed that judicial ac-
tion could not properly nullify constitutional provisions. Such provi-
sions must either be changed by the people or be given a sensible, fair, 
and substantial role by the Court. Miller opted for a great but still 
limited increase in federal power. His construction left little room for 
judicial imperialism, whereas the dissenters' test of fundamentality 
would have left the Court with vast discretionary authority to deny, 
disparage, or create rights. Of course, incorporation of the enumerated 
119. See 23 L.Ed. 588, 589 (where such concerns were brought before the Court). 
120. See supra notes 4, 7. 
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rights via the privileges or immunities clause was not the historical 
original intent. The historical intent encompassed numerous different 
understandings. 121 However, the appropriate point is that incorporat-
ing enumerated rights through the privileges or immunities clause is 
the only construction that responds both to the varied motivations be-
hind the amendment and to the constitutional language. 
The Miller opinion in Slaughter-House was thus one of substantial 
integrity that balanced the need for new federal protection of rights 
with the continued survival of states as independent centers of social 
policy. He began his analysis of constitutional meaning by rigorously 
examining the language and grammar of the fourteenth amendment. If 
that first step revealed ambiguity, the correct meaning was the one that 
fell within the parameters of the historical purpose of the provision, 
broadly considered. If various constructions suited the purpose, the 
Court would choose that construction most consonant with the rest of 
the Constitution. But in all this, Miller believed that every part of a 
constitutional provision had to be accorded substantial meaning. 
Whatever the Court's reasons for not overruling this portion of Slaugh-
ter-House, that element of constitutional wisdom is a good reason for 
maintaining it. If the current Supreme Court would follow Miller's ap-
proach, the Court could enliven the privileges or immunities clause by 
incorporating the enumerated privileges or immunities. This approach 
could also eliminate substantive due process analysis with relatively lit-
tle loss and could reestablish the federal government as an institution 
of only delegated powers. Whatever approach the Court takes, how-
ever, the Court cannot use Slaughter-House to justify the nullification 
of the privileges or immunities clause. 
121. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. 
REv. 5 (1949). See also Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 
939 (1951). 
